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WARRANTLESS GPS IN  
UNITED STATES V. JONES:  
IS 2011 THE NEW 1984? 
EDWARD BOEHME 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With technology rapidly changing police capabilities, the Supreme 
Court must continually harmonize technological advances with 
Fourth Amendment safeguards. United States v. Jones1 challenges the 
Court to balance such Fourth Amendment considerations by 
presenting the questions of whether the Fourth Amendment protects 
against the warrantless attachment of a Global Positioning System 
(GPS) tracking device to a vehicle and whether an individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the location information 
recorded by the device. This case stands to push the boundaries of the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and will test the Court’s 
ability to weigh “1984” concerns against law enforcement surveillance 
techniques. The Court likely will decide that the warrantless 
attachment of a GPS device violates the Fourth Amendment, but will 
hold that an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in publicly exposed location information. 
II.  FACTS 
In 2004, FBI agents and the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department 
formed a joint task force and began investigating Antoine Jones for 
cocaine trafficking.2 In addition to conducting visual surveillance, 
obtaining a pen register for Jones’s dialed numbers, and installing 
fixed cameras near Jones’s nightclub, the joint task force obtained a 
 
 J.D. Candidate, 2013, Duke University School of Law. I would like to thank Professors Joan 
A. Magat and Lisa Griffin for their advice and direction. I also want to give special thanks to 
Hannah Banks, Kara Duffle, Katie Hoelzer, Russell Gorkin, Ian Hampton, Jason Withers, and 
Greg Denis for their time, hard work, and editorial contributions in the creation of this 
commentary. 
 1.  United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. argued Nov. 8, 2011). 
 2.  Brief for United States at 2, Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. Aug. 11, 2011). 
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warrant to install a GPS tracking device on a jeep registered to 
Jones’s wife but frequently used by Jones.3 The warrant required the 
agents to install the GPS device in the District of Columbia within ten 
days of the warrant’s issuance.4 The agents, however, installed the 
device on the eleventh day in a public parking lot in Maryland, outside 
the sanctioned jurisdiction.5 The GPS device recorded Jones’s 
movements and transmitted the data in real time back to law 
enforcement for a four-week period.6 
Using the transmitted data to pattern Jones’s repeated presence at 
suspected stash houses, the joint task force obtained warrants and 
conducted several raids, finding narcotics, cash, and firearms at 
various locations.7 A federal grand jury then indicted Jones for 
conspiracy to distribute cocaine.8 The District Court denied Jones’s 
motion to suppress the GPS evidence but excluded any evidence 
obtained while the jeep was parked in his garage.9 Though jury hung 
on the conspiracy charge in the first trial,10 a second trial led to Jones’s 
conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and a sentence of life 
imprisonment.11 The D.C. Circuit reversed Jones’s conviction and 
denied a rehearing en banc, holding that the prolonged warrantless 
GPS tracking violated Jones’s reasonable expectation of privacy.12 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”13 As Justice Harlan 
explained in his concurrence in United States v. Katz,14 a warrantless 
 
 3.  Id. at 3. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Brief for Respondent at 4, Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. Sep. 26, 2011). 
 7.  Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 4. 
 8.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 5. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 6. 
 11.  Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 5–6. 
 12.  Id. at 6–9. 
 13.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 14.  389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In Katz, FBI agents attached an electronic 
listening device outside a phone booth to record the defendant’s conversations. Id. at 348 
(majority opinion). Even though the phone booth was in public, the Court held that attaching 
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law enforcement activity is considered a search if the person targeted 
has manifested a subjective expectation of privacy and society 
recognizes that expectation as reasonable.15 As an expectation’s 
“reasonableness” must be referenced to a source outside the Fourth 
Amendment, courts look not only to property law concepts but also 
to societal understandings.16 If the warrantless law enforcement 
activity is considered a search, it requires a judicially approved 
warrant to be held reasonable unless the government is able to prove 
one of a few recognized exceptions, such as “hot pursuit” or “incident 
to arrest.”17 According to the Supreme Court, the ex ante approval of 
warrants serves as an important judicial bulwark against the abuse of 
power.18 In fact, the Court has rejected the retroactive approval of 
warrants, even if law enforcement had probable cause, because it 
would hinge on the “far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event 
justification.”19 
In determining what constitutes a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, Katz and subsequent cases focus on what a person seeks to 
protect as private, even in a public area, rather than looking solely to 
the place where the private conduct was observed by public 
authorities.20 An individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in publicly exposed information because anyone can observe that 
information.21 Even though Katz focuses on the individual, homes still 
receive heightened protection, and thus, anything not in plain view in 
the home is generally considered protected against government 
observation.22 Further, law enforcement may in some cases conduct 
warrantless searches of otherwise protected areas if the search would 
 
the listening device without a warrant constituted a “search” and violated the defendant’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy because what the defendant sought to exclude was the 
“uninvited ear.” Id. at 352. One who occupies a phone booth would conclude that his 
conversation “will not be broadcast to the world” upon closing the door and paying the toll. Id. 
 15.  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 16.  Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978). 
 17.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 357–58. “Hot pursuit” means that police can enter into private areas 
during an emergency or while pursuing someone who has committed a crime. United States v. 
Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976). “Incident to arrest” refers to the ability of the police to 
arrest a person and search for weapons or other objects that would endanger the officer. Chimel 
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–64 (1969). 
 18.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
 19.  Id. at 357–58 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 20.  Id. at 351 (“For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”). 
 21.  United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983). 
 22.  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35, 40 (2001). 
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not reveal intimate details.23 
A. Public Exposure and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
In Katz’s person-focused approach, the extent to which someone 
exposes himself to the public affects whether his subjective 
expectation of privacy is reasonable. When someone travels in public, 
and notably on public thoroughfares, law enforcement may engage in 
visual surveillance without a warrant because an individual in public 
“voluntarily convey[s] to anyone who want[s] to look” where he is 
travelling and what he is doing.24 Technology that “augments” this 
visual surveillance does not necessarily violate the Fourth 
Amendment.25 In Knotts v. United States,26 Minnesota law enforcement 
suspected the defendant of manufacturing illegal drugs and used a 
beeper to track the transportation of a five-gallon drum of chloroform 
via public highways.27 The Court held that the beeper tracking did not 
amount to a search because the beeper revealed the same information 
that could have been obtained by an officer conducting visual 
surveillance.28 
Public exposure may not be dispositive, however, for the Supreme 
Court also looks to what an individual expects another to do. In Bond 
v. United States,29 for example, although “a bus passenger clearly 
expects that his bag may be handled,” the Supreme Court nonetheless 
concluded that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
when a border patrol agent squeezed the defendant’s luggage because 
passengers do not expect others to “feel the bag in an exploratory 
manner.”30 By contrast, the defendant in California v. Greenwood31 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy when police, in search of 
narcotics evidence, searched the defendant’s opaque garbage bags left 
on the curb.32 The Court found that the trash bags were accessible to 
 
 23.  United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 121 (1984). 
 24.  Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82. 
 25.  Id. at 282. 
 26.  460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 27.  Id. at 277. 
 28.  Id. at 285. 
 29.  529 U.S. 334 (2000). 
 30.  Id. at 338–39. The Supreme Court also noted that “tactile” observation differs from 
visual observation in that tactile observation involves a more “serious intrusion upon the 
sanctity of the person.” Id. at 337 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 31.  486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
 32.  Id. at 40. 
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“animals, children, scavengers, [and] snoops” in an area “particularly 
suited for public inspection” and “for the express purpose of having 
strangers take it.”33 
B. “Plain View” and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Homes 
Despite the emphasis on the person and his subjective expectation 
of privacy, homes still receive heightened protection under the Fourth 
Amendment.34 Any details within the home not in plain view are 
considered intimate and are therefore shielded from “prying 
government eyes.”35 For example, in their attempt to uncover a 
marijuana operation, the police in Kyllo v. United States36 violated the 
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy when they used a 
thermal-imaging device to detect heat emitting from inside the 
defendant’s house.37 By employing technology “not in general public 
use” without a warrant, the police acquired information attainable 
only with an unlawful physical intrusion into the home.38 
Police may, however, conduct surveillance without a warrant, even 
when the home is implicated, if the information is visible from a 
public vantage point. In California v. Ciraolo,39 Santa Clara police 
received a tip that the defendant was growing marijuana and, acting 
on the tip, used a plane to photograph the defendant’s backyard at an 
altitude of 1,000 feet.40 Because “private and commercial flights in the 
public airways” are routine and any member of the public flying at 
that altitude could have looked down and observed what the officers 
saw, the Court held that this warrantless aerial surveillance was not a 
search.41 The Fourth Amendment does not require police to “shield 
their eyes” when observing activities visible from a “public vantage 
point.”42 Similarly, in Florida v. Riley,43 the Court held that the use of a 
helicopter at 400 feet to observe the backyard of a defendant was 
permissible for two reasons: the officer complied with all flight 
 
 33.  Id. at 40–41 (quoting United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1981)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 34.  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 37.  Id. at 29, 40. 
 38.  Id. at 40. 
 39.  476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
 40.  Id. at 213. 
 41.  Id. at 213–14. 
 42.  Id. at 213. 
 43.  488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
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regulations44 and the observation revealed “no intimate details 
connected with the use of the home or curtilage.”45 
C. The Permissibility of Searches Revealing Only Non-Intimate Details 
The potential of a search to reveal intimate or private details is 
another factor courts consider in determining whether police violated 
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, in 
United States v. Jacobsen,46 a FedEx supervisor, pursuant to the 
company’s insurance policy, opened a damaged package to inspect it.47 
After discovering a white powdery substance, the employee 
rewrapped the package and alerted the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA).48 Two DEA field tests confirmed that the 
powder was cocaine.49 The Court held that the DEA field tests were 
not an unreasonable search because the tests determined only 
whether the substance was cocaine and revealed no other private 
details.50 
Nonetheless, law enforcement cannot use a defendant’s property 
without his knowledge and consent to reveal even non-intimate 
details. In Silverman v. United States,51 the officers attached a spike 
microphone to the heating duct on the defendant’s house to 
investigate a suspected gambling operation.52 The Court held that the 
officers violated the Fourth Amendment because they “usurp[ed] part 
of the petitioners’ house . . . without their knowledge and without 
their consent.”53 
 
 44.  Id. at 451. 
 45.  Id. at 452. 
 46.  466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
 47.  Id. at 111. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 111–12. 
 50.  See id. at 123 (noting that Congress already determined that no one has a legitimate 
privacy interest in cocaine because of its illegality); see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 
707 (1983) (holding that the use of narcotics-sniffing dogs violates no legitimate privacy interest 
because such a search does not involve opening luggage or revealing noncontraband items); 
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 233–34, 236 (1986) (holding that aerial 
photography of Dow Chemical’s industrial complex was legal because the company was already 
subject to heavy environmental regulation, the government is generally granted greater latitude 
in inspecting commercial property, and the photographs did not reveal intimate activities such 
as chemical formulas, trade secrets, or individual privacy). 
 51.  365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
 52.  Id. at 506–07. 
 53.  Id. at 511. 
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IV.  HOLDING 
In United States v. Maynard,54 the D.C. Circuit held that GPS 
tracking of respondent Jones for twenty-four hours a day over a four-
week period violated Jones’s reasonable expectation of privacy.55 
Analyzing whether the use of GPS-enhanced surveillance constituted 
a search, the court first determined that Knotts was not controlling 
precedent.56 According to the court, Knotts applied only to “limited” 
technological tracking on a “discrete journey” and reserved the 
question of prolonged, twenty-four hour surveillance for cases like the 
one at issue.57 
The court then discussed whether Jones had exposed his 
movements to the public,58 reiterating that the reasonable expectation 
of privacy regarding publicly exposed information depends on what 
an individual expects another to do.59 The court ruled that Jones had 
neither “actually” nor “constructively” exposed his movements.60 First, 
because the likelihood that an individual would observe “all those 
movements” over the course of a month was “essentially nil,” the 
court held that Jones’s movements were not “actually” exposed.61 
Second, employing the “mosaic” theory articulated in People v. 
Weaver,62 the court also held that Jones movements were not 
“constructively” exposed.63 The D.C. Circuit noted that prolonged 
surveillance by a GPS device reveals a holistic and intimate picture of 
a person’s private life by disclosing a large volume of personal details 
that an individual would not expect to be pieced together.64 Although 
 
 54.  615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, No. 10-
1259 (U.S. argued Nov. 8, 2011). 
 55.  Id. at 555–56. 
 56.  Id. (citing United States v. Knotts, 469 U.S. 276, 283 (1983)). 
 57.  Id. at 556 (citing Knotts, 469 U.S. at 283–84 (noting that the case did not involve 
twenty-hour surveillance and that “‘if such dragnet type law enforcement . . . should eventually 
occur, there will be time enough to determine whether different constitutional principles may be 
applicable’”)). 
 58.  Id. at 558–63. 
 59.  Id. at 559. 
 60.  Id. at 558. 
 61.  Id. at 558–59. The court contrasted the highly unlikely scenario of following someone 
day after day over the course of the month with the more likely situation of an individual 
observing another for a single journey. Id. at 560. 
 62.  909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009). 
 63.  Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561–62 (citing Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199). 
 64.  See id. at 563 (“A reasonable person does not expect anyone to monitor and retain a 
record of every time he drives his car, including his origin, route, destination, and each place he 
stops and how long he stays there; rather, he expects each of those movements to remain 
‘disconnected and anonymous.’”). 
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Jones’s individual movements were exposed, the whole of his 
movements were not, and therefore, the court held that Jones had a 
subjective expectation of privacy.65 
Finally, the court concluded that society would recognize Jones’s 
expectation of privacy as reasonable.66 As the Supreme Court had 
stated previously, “‘[e]xpectations of privacy must have a source 
outside the Fourth Amendment,’ such as ‘understandings that are 
recognized or permitted by society.’”67 The D.C. Circuit pointed to 
state criminal codes that exclude warrantless GPS evidence as an 
indication that society recognizes Jones’s expectation of privacy as 
reasonable.68 The court also distinguished permissible visual 
surveillance from the prolonged GPS tracking in this case.69 Unlike 
visual surveillance, which is naturally constrained by the time and 
expense of manpower, along with the risk of being sighted, the low 
cost of GPS tracking “occasion[s] a heretofore unknown type of 
intrusion into an ordinarily and hitherto private enclave.”70 The court 
ultimately held that the warrantless GPS evidence should have been 
excluded.71 
V.  ARGUMENTS 
The government and Jones focus on three main issues. First, 
whether Jones had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location 
information gathered by the GPS device. Second, whether Jones had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy against the actual attachment of the 
GPS device to the jeep. Last, whether the government should be 
permitted to use a reasonable suspicion standard when employing 
GPS tracking without a warrant. 
A.  Petitioner Government’s Arguments 
The government appeals the D.C. Circuit’s decision on three 
grounds: first, Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
jeep’s location information because the information was already 
 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 563 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 n.22 (1984)). 
 68.  Id. at 564. 
 69.  Id. at 565–66. 
 70.  Id. at 565. 
 71.  Id. at 568 (stating that the error of admitting the GPS evidence was not harmless 
because the evidence was “far from ‘overwhelming’”). 
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publicly exposed; second, Jones had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy against the actual attachment of the GPS device to the jeep; 
and third, even if a search or seizure occurred, it was reasonable 
because the government’s interest in uncovering a large narcotics 
operation outweighs the minimal intrusion on Jones’s privacy interest. 
First, the government contends that no search occurred when 
agents used a GPS tracking device to record the jeep’s location 
information on public roads because Jones did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy regarding movements that he exposed to the 
public.72 The government argues that Katz and its progeny emphasize 
the distinction between private details and publicly exposed 
information.73 The government asserts that, like in Knotts, the GPS 
merely tracked the movements of Jones’s vehicle on public roads, 
which were exposed to “anyone who wanted to look.”74 
According to the government, it is immaterial that no one would 
have observed all of Jones’s movements over the course of a month.75 
Neither Greenwood nor Bond depended on the likelihood that 
someone would observe the information.76 The government also 
rejects the D.C. Circuit’s “mosaic theory,” arguing that no case has 
found a reasonable expectation of privacy in the “totality of [one’s] 
public movements” when each movement is publicly exposed.77 Both 
the “likelihood” standard and the “mosaic” theory present 
unworkable tests because they provide guidance for neither 
predicting the likelihood that one would observe a set of movements 
nor analyzing how prolonged the surveillance must be before it 
 
 72.  Brief for United States, supra note 2, at 37–38. 
 73.  See id. at 18–22. In Knotts, the Court sanctioned the warrantless use of a beeper to 
track the defendant while he traveled on public thoroughfares because the defendant conveyed 
to “anyone who wanted to look” the fact that he was traveling on such public thoroughfares. Id. 
at 19–20 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277–78, 281–82 (1983)). According to the 
government, the Court in Kyllo likewise focused on the distinction between private details and 
publicly exposed information when it determined that the use of a thermal-imaging device was a 
search because the device revealed private information inside the home not obtainable without 
physical intrusion. Id. at 22 (discussing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29, 34, 40 (2001)). 
 74.  Id. at 38 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 75.  Id. at 22–23. 
 76.  See id. at 24–25. The government reasoned that Greenwood’s outcome depended not 
on the likelihood that someone would sort through the opaque trash bags, but rather the ready 
access to the trash bags by any member of the public because of their location. Id. at 24 (citing 
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–41 (1988)). Similarly, Bond distinguished “physical” 
and “tactile” observation and highlighted the fact that the physical manipulation of the luggage 
revealed private information that had not already been publicly exposed. Id. at 25 (citing Bond 
v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337–39 (2000)). 
 77.  Id. at 27–28. 
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becomes “mosaic.”78 
The government also argues that “hypothetical misuses” and 
“dragnet surveillance” are inappropriate considerations in a case 
limited to the GPS tracking of one individual.79 Though the Court in 
Knotts reserved the question of “dragnet surveillance,” such 
surveillance refers to “mass or widespread search or seizures 
conducted without individualized suspicion,” which is not the case 
with Jones.80 Even if GPS tracking raises such concerns, prophylactic 
measures should be taken through the legislative process rather than 
through the “distortion of Fourth Amendment doctrine.”81 
Second, with respect to the exterior of the vehicle, the government 
contends that Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy against 
the attachment of the GPS device to his vehicle.82 The attachment of 
the GPS device revealed no private information and therefore did not 
constitute a search.83 The attachment also did not meaningfully 
interfere with Jones’s possessory interest in the jeep—so as to 
constitute a seizure—because the GPS device did not affect the 
vehicle’s “driving qualities.”84 As the Court stated in United States v. 
Karo,85 trespass alone is “neither necessary nor sufficient to establish 
a [seizure].”86 
Finally, even if the Court finds a search or seizure, the government 
contends that the attachment of the GPS device was reasonable.87 The 
government argues that current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
dictates that the Court conduct a balancing test to determine the 
reasonableness of a search or seizure by comparing the “degree to 
which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy” to the need to promote 
“legitimate government interests.”88 Here, according to the 
 
 78.  Id. at 31. 
 79.  Id. at 37. 
 80.  Id. at 34. 
 81.  Id. at 35. 
 82.  Id. at 39. 
 83.  Id. at 41. The government distinguished between the GPS device’s potential to reveal 
private information, achieved upon installation of the device, and actual revelation of the 
information, not realized until after it started transmitting. Id. at 42. 
 84.  Id. at 44. 
 85.  468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 86.  Brief for United States, supra note 2, at 43 (quoting Karo, 468 U.S. at 712) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 87.  Id. at 47. 
 88.  Id. at 48 (quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The government relies on the reasoning in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in 
which the Court looked to the “reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular 
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government, the individual privacy interest remains “minimal” 
because the only information revealed by the GPS device is the 
vehicle’s location, which is already obtainable through visual 
surveillance.89 Also, requiring a warrant would impair the 
“government’s ability to investigate leads and tips on drug trafficking, 
terrorism, and other crimes.”90 The government argues that because its 
interest in uncovering a large-scale narcotics operation outweighed 
the minimal intrusion on Jones’s privacy, the “particularized suspicion 
was more than adequate to support the warrantless attachment of a 
mobile tracking device” to Jones’s vehicle.91 
B.  Respondent Jones’s Arguments 
Jones’s brief centers on three main arguments: first, the 
information collected by the GPS device violated his reasonable 
expectation of privacy; second, the installation itself violated his 
reasonable expectation of privacy and meaningfully interfered with 
his possessory interest in the vehicle; and third, the reasonable 
suspicion standard for GPS tracking should not be used in lieu of a 
warrant supported by probable cause. 
First, asserting that the agents violated his reasonable expectation 
of privacy, Jones argues that the government recorded the whole of 
his movements to a “degree not feasible through visual surveillance.”92 
Even though each separate movement itself might be publicly 
exposed, the whole of one’s movements is not because the “likelihood 
a stranger would observe all those movements is . . . essentially nil.”93 
Because of the uniquely private nature of an individual’s “pattern of 
movements and locations,” prolonged monitoring presents the danger 
of the “twenty-four hour surveillance” espoused in Knotts, an 
argument that resembles the “mosaic theory” used by the D.C. Circuit 
in Maynard.94 
 
 
governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security” during a street stop and frisk. Brief for 
United States, supra note 2, at 48 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 89.  Id. at 49–50. 
 90.  Id. at 50. 
 91.  Id. at 51. 
 92.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 43. 
 93.  Id. (quoting United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted 
sub nom. United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. argued Nov. 8, 2011)). 
 94.  Compare id. at 43–44 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983)) with 
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562 (describing the “mosaic” theory). 
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Second, Jones argues that the warrantless attachment of the 
device itself was an unreasonable search because the attachment 
usurped Jones’s property.95 Based on the Court’s holding in Silverman 
that “usurpation of property [is] a search,” Jones argues that the 
agents misappropriated his property by converting the jeep into a 
mobile tracking device for the government’s purposes.96 Because 
attaching a GPS device without another’s consent can lead to both a 
trespass claim and criminal liability under anti-stalking statutes, Jones 
argues that society would consider his subjective expectation against 
GPS attachment to be reasonable.97 Jones cautions that such 
unrestrained GPS tracking presents the danger of “indiscriminate 
monitoring” because the low marginal cost of GPS attachment, as 
compared to the high cost of visual surveillance, permits police to 
conduct “suspicionless GPS monitoring of networks of individuals 
and even entire neighborhoods, towns, or cities.”98 
Jones also maintains that the agents conducted an unreasonable 
seizure because the GPS device “meaningfully interfered with Jones’s 
possessory interest” in the jeep.99 Jones argues that the government’s 
attachment changed the character of the vehicle by undermining 
Jones’s possessory right to exclude others from the use of the jeep.100 
Because “a private individual’s surreptitious use of a GPS device 
against another would constitute trespass to chattels and possibly 
even criminal conduct,” Jones reasonably believed that his right to 
exclude others would not be violated by law enforcement.101 Contrary 
to the government’s position, meaningful interference need not 
involve damage or destruction to the property.102 Rather, the Fourth 
Amendment protects against “purposeful” interference and abuses of 
power.103 
 
 95.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 16–17 (arguing that the government’s 
“usurpation” of Jones’s property “supports the conclusion that his privacy expectations were 
reasonable,” and therefore that the search was unreasonable). 
 96.  Id. at 18–19 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506–07 (1961)). 
 97.  Id. at 20. 
 98.  Id. at 26–27. Jones also notes that unlike GPS monitoring, an equivalent level of 
human surveillance would require an extraordinary amount of personnel and resources, which 
acts as a check against the kinds of indiscriminate abuses and monitoring that the Fourth 
Amendment was designed to protect. Id. at 25. 
 99.  Id. at 46. 
 100.  Id. at 48–49. 
 101.  Id. at 49. 
 102.  Id. at 50. 
 103.  Id. at 51. 
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Finally, Jones claims that the government’s balancing test for the 
warrantless use of a GPS device is inappropriate.104 Not only does the 
government’s reasonable suspicion standard have no basis in the 
Fourth Amendment as a workaround to probable cause,105 but the 
government, in justifying the balancing test in its favor, mistakenly 
assumes that the intrusion was minor and exaggerates the efficiency 
gains law enforcement would enjoy as a result of GPS use.106 Jones 
further maintains that the reasonable suspicion standard is 
unworkable because the government is not required to record its 
reasons for warrantless GPS tracking and, even if it were required, the 
innocent would never know whether their rights were violated.107 By 
contrast, a “neutral magistrate” deciding ex ante whether a search or 
seizure is justified can better ensure protection against surreptitious 
GPS monitoring.108 
VI.  ANALYSIS AND DISPOSITION 
Unfettered GPS monitoring portends a world enveloped by 
unforgettable images of “1984.” In the most probable scenario, the 
Court will rule in favor of Jones and will attempt to strike a balance 
between the “1984” concerns of unfettered GPS monitoring and the 
need of law enforcement to use visual surveillance and video camera 
techniques. First, the Court likely will hold that Jones did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the location information 
gathered by the GPS device. Second, the Court probably will decide 
that the actual affixing of the GPS on the jeep violated Jones’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Third, the Court is likely to reject 
the reasonable suspicion standard proposed by the government as 
undermining the constitutional safeguards of requiring a warrant, 
noting that the warrant requirement is more feasible and less 
burdensome than law enforcement suggests. 
 
 
 104.  Id. at 56. 
 105.  Id. at 57–58. 
 106.  Id. at 58. In retort to the “minor intrusion” argument, Jones points to the GPS device’s 
infringement on property rights as well as its ability to generate a holistic view of an individual’s 
life. Id. Jones also explains the exaggeration of efficiency gains by noting the government’s 
admission that it cannot know ahead of time whether the device will generate private data. Id. 
 107.  Id. at 60. 
 108.  See id. (“[Fourth Amendment rights] would be all the more difficult to protect if the 
government were free to engage in surreptitious GPS monitoring without first persuading a 
neutral magistrate that a search or seizure is justified.”). 
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First, the Court likely will hold that Jones did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy over his location information 
because his movements were actually exposed. Here, Knotts is the 
most analogous case.109 GPS tracking devices, like the beeper in 
Knotts, transmit publicly exposed information—in this case, Jones’s 
travels on public roads.110 Bond suggests that Jones had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements because these expectations 
may be borne from what an individual expects another to do.111 That 
proposition is likely limited, however, to “tactile” or more physically 
intrusive observation, considering that Ciraolo and Riley depended on 
the ability of an individual to observe the defendant’s private 
property while flying overhead, not whether an individual was likely 
do so.112 During oral argument, the Court strongly hinted at the 
trouble of finding a search by inviting Jones’s counsel to distinguish 
GPS tracking from a string of video cameras or thirty deputies 
monitoring public streets.113 As the Seventh Circuit noted, unlike the 
thermal-imaging device in Kyllo, a GPS device is merely a substitute 
for “following a car on a public street”—a permissible act under the 
Fourth Amendment.114 
Second, the Court is likely to be more persuaded by Jones’s 
arguments regarding the usurpation and physical intrusion of his jeep. 
Reasonable expectations of privacy must be referenced to a source 
outside the Fourth Amendment, such as property law and societal 
understandings.115 Jones argues that if anti-stalking laws and trespass 
claims prohibit private individuals from affixing a GPS device to track 
another private individual, then it would be amiss to permit police, 
under the auspice of the Fourth Amendment, to do what private 
individuals cannot.116 
 
 109.  See generally United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (discussing the warrantless 
use of a beeper to track the defendant). 
 110.  See id. at 281–82 (“[H]e voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact 
that he was traveling over particular roads in a particular direction.”). 
 111.  See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000) (“[A] bus passenger clearly 
expects that his bag may be handled. He does not expect that other passengers or bus 
employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner.”). 
 112.  See id. at 337 (emphasis added) (distinguishing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 
(1986), and Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), from Bond, 529 U.S. 334, and noting that “any 
member of the public could have fully observed the defendant’s property by flying overhead”). 
 113.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 33–35, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. Nov. 
8, 2011). 
 114.  United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 115.  Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978). 
 116.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 20. 
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Several cases support this argument. In Riley and Ciraolo, no 
search occurred when law enforcement merely did what members of 
the public could already do: observe property made visible from a 
particular public vantage point.117 In Greenwood, the police officers’ 
search of the defendant’s garbage was permissible because of the 
trash bags’ placement on the side of a public street and accessibility 
by any member of the public.118 If the Fourth Amendment limits 
warrantless police conduct to what members of the public may do, 
then consistency may compel the Court to find that Jones’s subjective 
expectation of privacy against the agents’ attachment of the device to 
the jeep was reasonable because the action would be illegal for 
private individuals. Further, Silverman demonstrates that the Fourth 
Amendment may prohibit police officers from usurping a defendant’s 
property for their own investigative ends.119 The Court in Bond also 
recognized that physical invasions120 are more intrusive than mere 
visual surveillance and considered what an individual expects others 
to do in those cases.121 Both propositions, then, appear to militate 
against police usurping Jones’s jeep as their own tracking device and 
undermining Jones’s property right to exclude others from its use. 
Finally, the Court likely will reject the government’s call for a 
reasonable suspicion standard. The government argues for such a 
standard in the context of GPS-enhanced surveillance because a 
probable cause standard would unduly burden investigations.122 This 
argument ignores the justification for the judicial bulwark between 
law enforcement and private citizens.123 The government, in arguing 
that the warrant requirement would be too burdensome, assumes that 
expectations of privacy are unimportant in the context of GPS 
surveillance. Because “reasonable” expectations of privacy determine 
the scope of Fourth Amendment protection, the “burden” of the 
 
 117.  Riley, 488 U.S. at 454–55; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213–14. 
 118.  California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988). 
 119.  See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (holding that officers could 
not usurp the heat duct serving the defendant’s property by attaching a spike microphone to 
eavesdrop on the defendant’s gambling operation). 
 120.  Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000) (quoting Riley, 488 U.S. at 449) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 121.  See id. (“[P]hysical manipulation of his luggage ‘far exceeded the casual contact 
[petitioner] could have expected from other passengers.’”). 
 122.  Brief for United States, supra note 2, at 50. 
 123.  See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) (citation omitted) (“The primary 
reason for the warrant requirement is to interpose a ‘neutral and detached magistrate’ between 
the citizen and ‘the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’”). 
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warrant is actually irrelevant to the inquiry of whether a warrant 
should be required in the first place. To analogize, one could not argue 
that intrusions into the home should be on a lesser “reasonable 
suspicion” standard simply because requiring a warrant for the search 
of the home would unduly burden investigations.124 Instead, courts 
require police to furnish additional evidence and establish probable 
cause before issuing a warrant to search a house because these 
searches invade reasonable expectations of privacy.125 The Chief 
Justice emphasized this point by asking why the government wanted a 
different rule to apply to GPS tracking.126 A court could simply 
require police to gather additional evidence and establish probable 
cause before installing a GPS device. 
Moreover, the Court is likely to find that a warrant requirement 
for GPS tracking is not overly burdensome on law enforcement. 
Justice Ginsburg addressed this point during oral argument by noting 
that the agents in this case had already received a warrant as required 
by their surveillance manual.127 Unlike visual surveillance, where 
beneficial and warrantless use can stem from on-the-spot surveillance 
of suspicious acts, GPS tracking requires advanced preparation and 
planning due to the coordination of the GPS’s installation, possible 
battery replacement, and ultimate analysis of the information.128 This 
advanced preparation and planning suggests that police might not 
otherwise invest in GPS surveillance against an individual unless they 
already possess enough information to prompt the belief that it would 
uncover more evidence.129 Thus, a warrant requirement for GPS 
tracking would not present the extraordinary burdens that the 
government suggests,130 especially because police have capably 
conducted such investigations prior to the advent of GPS technology. 
 
 124.  Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356, 358 (1967) (noting that retroactive 
approval of search warrants “‘bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective 
predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an 
after-the-event justification’” (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964))). 
 125.  See id. (articulating the Court’s disfavor of law enforcement bypassing the 
constitutional safeguard of the warrant requirement). 
 126.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 113, at 17–18. 
 127.  Id. at 16–17. 
 128.  See, e.g., United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 607–08 (8th Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1213–14 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 
995–96 (7th Cir. 2007); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1196 (N.Y. 2009); State v. Jackson, 
76 P.3d 217, 220–21 (Wash. 2003). 
 129.  See, e.g., cases cited supra note 128. 
 130.  Brief for United States, supra note 2, at 50. 
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In essence, the Court manifested grave “1984” concerns over 
unfettered, warrantless GPS tracking and expressed a desire for a 
limiting principle.131 The Court had trouble, however, distinguishing 
visual surveillance and video cameras from Jones’s case.132 By deciding 
Jones’s reasonable expectation of privacy on “usurpation” grounds 
rather than on location information grounds, the Court can strike a 
balance. On one hand, the Court safeguards against “1984” mass-
surveillance scenarios by prohibiting law enforcement from 
converting a person’s car, coat, or cell phone into a tracking device in 
derogation of his property rights. On the other hand, the government 
could still use visual surveillance and public video cameras because 
individuals have no legitimate privacy expectation in publicly exposed 
location information. 
By deciding that Jones’s movements were actually exposed, 
however, the Court avoids opining on the “mosaic theory” of 
constructive exposure put forth by both the D.C. Circuit and Jones. 
The consequence could be that the Court ironically leaves open the 
possibility that law enforcement may compile complete profiles of 
individuals through Internet data mining.133 Although the Court may 
have avoided “1984” with respect to GPS monitoring, the threat of 
mass data collection programs means that “Big Brother” still looms to 
cast a pall over Fourth Amendment protections. 
 
 
 131.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 113, at 12–13. (“[A]s I understand it and 
certainly share the concern . . . if [the government wins] the case then there is nothing to prevent 
the police or the government from monitoring 24 hours a day the public movements of every 
citizen in the United States.”). 
 132.  Id. at 34–35, 38. 
 133.  See Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
107, 121 (Summer 2010) (discussing the Total Information Awareness program and other 
government mass-collection efforts to create profiles through data-mining of “credit-card 
purchases, tax returns, driver’s license data, work permits, travel itineraries,” and more). 
 
